Section IV: Hacking Physics 1 – Excerpt 14 of 14

Philosopher Galen Strawson's "Real Physicalism" Part 3: Category Identity Condtions

Premises 1918 - 1977

Draft 08 January 2024; reading time approximately 33 minutes. Edited versions will be dated when those corrections are posted. Last update 08 January 2024

Category Identity Conditions

1918. Seven: a seventh feature of Strawson’s real physicalism is his denial of the immaterial category (1918i), which positions Strawson, like virtually all physicalists deep into the fatal logical reification category error. Strawson denies immaterial causality. Strawson denies there is any path between immaterial and physical; he claims no such path is required because in monism everything is one physical kind of “stuff” (1889i). How could there be a path between immaterial and physical if there is no immaterial category? That assumption alone, if correct would pretty much solve the hard problem of consciousness and save the doctrine of physicalism, but it is a false assumption, therefore does not solve the hard problem of consciousness and does not save the doctrine of physicalism.

i.      “Compare the way in which the word ‘immaterial’ comes to seem to have some positive descriptive meaning although it quite explicitly has none.” Galen Strawson¹

Every, Some and Only Identity Conditions

1919. If you are, like Strawson, having difficulty to imagine what immaterial category could possibly be, what “descriptive meaning” (1918i) the word immaterial could communicate, I present a brief introduction to identity conditions of the immaterial category; this is not a complete theory of the immaterial category, but it is a coherent beginning.

1920. Every object without exception, for instance every category and every instance of every category has a set of identity conditions, including at least one that is not shared with any other object; however, most objects also have identity conditions that are shared with other objects.

1921. Identity conditions are necessary otherwise an object could not be what it actually is. If this were not true, no one could ever be sure which object, say which category or instance of a category was being correctly and unambiguously referred to. Tautological identity: X = X exactly, only and always, in every possible universe. Identity conditions add semantic (= language) and/or mathematical detail to explain specifically what any object exactly, only and always is.

1922. Not all identity conditions are of the same quality; they do not all communicate with the same explanatory power, for instance some are weak and some are strong. A further classification includes four state conditions that determine strong or weak: 1) the weakest identity conditions are those that are shared with other categories and instances of categories, 2) weak identity conditions are those that only some instances within a category have, 3) strong identity conditions are those that every instance within a category necessarily has, and 4) the strongest identity conditions are those than only instances within a category have and every instance of the category also has them.

1923. Any identity condition that is shared with more than one object is useful to define each of those objects, but those identity conditions are too weak, therefore not useful to clearly differentiate between them.

1924. To most clearly describe, define and explain the immaterial category we would want to know what identity condition(s) only the immaterial category has and what identity condition(s) the immaterial category always has. That is not simple nor is it obvious.

1925. To most clearly describe, define and explain the physical category we would want to know what identity condition(s) only the physical category has and what identity condition(s) the physical category always has. That is not simple nor is it obvious.

1926. I will at least make a beginning (= certainly subject to future editing), which means I leave consistent and complete for a future project (that would be an excellent Ph.D. thesis topic for some graduate student). My intention is to make relatively clear the ontological existence and epistemological truth of the immaterial category, but that necessarily includes references to the physical category (for instance the strongest clarity of understanding requires that you know both what something is and what it is not). I do not go into any detailed explanation for state conditions on these lists, rather my intention is to make the case strong that the immaterial category is real = exist + true. Complete and consistent details are not required to accomplish that objective.

Physical Category Identity Conditions

1927. The physical category entails instances of physical objects. Examples of physical objects include everything you can see and bump into, for instance chairs, rocks, automobiles, giraffes and other human physical bodies (including physical brains), etc.

1928. Only the physical category has these identity conditions (partial list). Only does not mean every instance of the physical category has all of these identity conditions. These identity conditions occur only in physical categories and instances of physical categories. These identity conditions do not occur in the immaterial category or instances of the immaterial category (ever). Contents of this list do not deny that interactions and relations between physical and immaterial categories do occur.

• a-posteriori appearance [+ EVERY]

• exclude more than one object from occupying the same space at the same time (baryonic matter mass) [+ EVERY]

• dense enough that you can see and bump into them (baryonic matter mass) [not every]

• transformations between particle and wave forms [yes every elementary mass unit, but not every complex physical object]

• interactions governed by the four classical physics fundamental natural forces (electromagnetism, strong nuclear, weak nuclear and gravity) [+ EVERY]

• matter mass [not every]

• intrinsic motion mass (momentum, velocity, speed, etc.) [not every]

• intrinsic Brownian motion [+ EVERY elementary mass unit and every complex physical object because elementary is constituent of complex]

• path of propagation [+ EVERY]

• scattering upon collision with other objects [not every]

• spatial location; specific or pass through [+ EVERY]

• temporal location [+ EVERY]

• spin, polarization, electric charge, color charge [not every]

• entropy [+ EVERY]

• energy-mass conservation [+ EVERY]

• governed by a set of laws of physics (say thermodynamics or automatic mechanistic deterministic causality) [+ EVERY]

• governed by a set of natural laws (say evolution = natural selection) [+ EVERY]

Immaterial Category Identity Conditions

1929. The immaterial category entails instances of immaterial objects. Examples of immaterial objects include: eternal, God, Aseity, all forms of consciousness, thoughts (=cognition), feelings (= emotions), sensations, experiences, love, values, morals, goals, vision, creativity, imagination, ideas, abstractions, all mathematics, logic, knowledge, wisdom, ineffable life, truth, a-priori, etc.

1930. Only the immaterial category has these identity conditions (partial list). Only does not mean every instance of the immaterial category has all of these identity conditions. These identity conditions occur only in immaterial categories and instances of immaterial categories. These identity conditions do not occur in the physical category or instances of the physical category. Contents of this list do not deny that interactions and relations between physical and immaterial categories do occur.

• governed by immaterial lifeforce [+ EVERY]

• a-temporal (independent of temporal dimension time; not determined, defined, caused, or limited by time) [+ EVERY]

• a-spatial (independent of spatial dimension location; not determined, defined, caused or limited by location) [+ EVERY]

• simultaneous (possible = potential to exist everywhere all-at-once; a-temporal and a-spatial) [+ EVERY]

• a-priori-1 (independent of empirical observation = independent of physical) [+ EVERY]

• invisible (does not interact with electromagnetic radiation; a-priori-1)

• a-priori-2 (exists before anything physical began to exist) [not every]

• a-priori-3 (interacts causally with physical category objects) [not every]

• substance (original source of meta-information and physical forms; a-priori-3) [not every]

• power of intentional immaterial causality over physical (a-priori-3) [not every]

• genesis-emanate immaterial causality (a-priori-3) [not every; only eternal]

• genesis-create immaterial causality (a-priori-3) [not every; only superconsciousness]

• create-manifest immaterial causality (a-priori-3) [not every; only ego consciousness]

• a-entropic (independent of entropy; zero resistance to pass-through by any other object) [+ EVERY]

• a-thermodynamic (independent of thermodynamics; no intrinsic exchange of heat) [+ EVERY]

• eternal, Aseity, God… (there is only one, with multiple names)

• omni-anything (predicate reference exclusive to eternal)

• consciousness (superconsciousness, witness consciousness and ego consciousness) [not every]

• senses; sentience = feeling experiences [ego consciousness only]

• cognition (mental thought, abstraction, imagination, self-awareness = awareness of awareness, intention, attention) [not every]

• affection (emotions, feelings, experience) [not every]

Path Realism

1931. The path problem is how can we explain (consistent and complete) a path between immaterial and physical categories and instances of categories, for example from consciousness to physical or from physical to consciousness? In particular, the ontological challenge is 1) how the two categories could causally interact, 2) what is the direction of that causality, and 3) what is the path followed from state A to state B (whatever A and B are symbols for). The path problem is actually the original source problem which is also the substance problem. For instance, to understand categories requires that you include a description of what caused a category to begin to exist. Not only that, it is also necessary to explain what caused the beginning of beginning; what caused the first-first (= hypostasis), and what caused the first physical thing in the first universe (= beginning of physical). The original source problem is the substance problem, because in my cosmology, substance is not that which is created (for instance every physical object exists with beginning and every physical object must be caused to begin, therefore no physical object is substantial; Leibniz 748), rather, substance is that which originally and intentionally causes something else to begin to exist. Substance includes immaterial eternal, and all forms of consciousness. Only immaterial can be substantial. Everything in the physical category is strictly ontologically limited to appearance only, without substance. Substance includes three kinds of immaterial original intentional causality: genesis-emanate, genesis-create and create manifest. Those kinds of causality are intentional not automatic. The common mechanistic deterministic and mechanistic uncertainty kinds of causality are automatic, not intentional, therefore not substance. 

1932. Closely related is the quantum superposition problem, for instance the common assumption in physics is that superpositions are physical and that they are hosted, like everything physical, in the actual existence domain. However, that is a problem because there is nothing physical in superposition before it interacts with or is observed by other objects, but it is certain that superpositions exist before they interact with or are observed by other objects (I discuss superpositions in Section VIII).

1933. Realism requires that a path between categories is knowable. All interactions and all relations (certainly including causal relations) must follow some knowable path. A path requires bridge objects that separate and connect say two categories, for instance a path from A = physical category and B = immaterial category. If two categories are permitted to causally interact with each other, that is only possible if bridge objects offer a permissive path (= from A → to B or from B → to A); like the fact that you can only drive an automobile across a river if there is a bridge. Bridges themselves do not cause anything, rather they have permissive power but not power of causality. A bridge across a river permits crossing but does not cause vehicles to cross.

1934. Instances of bridge objects that connect and separate physical and immaterial categories include this partial list. These objects are a mix of physical, immaterial and simultaneously physical/immaterial (as noted).

• simultaneous physical and immaterial life (ineffable: not emergent from physical, not a simple sum of organic parts)

• immaterial superconsciousness = hypostasis = first-first = beginning of beginning; power of immaterial genesis-create causality

• immaterial witness consciousness = bridge between superconsciousness and ego consciousness

• immaterial ego consciousness = bridge between consciousness and physical (decodes now, interprets and bestows meaning upon now; immaterial); ·         power of immaterial create-manifest causality

• physical non-material emptiness (offers no entropy resistance for any object physical or immaterial to pass through; not a physical matter mass object)

• immaterial near-existence domain = bridge domain between superconsciousness and physical existence domain; potential physical, never actual physical even after interactions and relations with other objects

Dualism Within Monism – Is vs Is-Not

1935. An identity condition of monism is meta-wholeness = wholeness of wholeness. Monism does not require an absence of a multiplicity of objects but dualism is multiplicity and that fact which is so easily empirically observable means it is necessary that there are wholes within wholes = holon unity of wholeness.

1936. If a universe exists, monism = wholeness is necessary. If a universe exists, dualism = multiplicity is necessary. It is necessary that dualism exists inside monism, otherwise we could never sort out the distinctions between “every”, “some” and “only” as predicates for identity conditions of categories, in fact we could not have categories at all without dualism. Monism literally requires categories of categories, kinds of kinds, groups of groups, classes of classes, sets of sets, etc., all of which are instances of dualism.

1937. There are additional properties, functions and relations that objects have, but those properties, functions and relations can be shared with so many other objects that they cannot qualify as identity conditions. I will not try to identify any examples of all the instances of possible properties, functions and relations of objects.

1938. Let’s say you want to describe a container that is empty, for example an empty basket. It would tell you virtually nothing about an empty basket to list all the objects that are not in the basket. In fact, if I say, there are no apples in the basket, that tells me something about apples, for instance that they are not located in the basket and if I am looking for apples, looking in an empty basket is not where I will find them, but that description offers nothing useful about the empty basket itself. I could substitute the name for any object and say that object is not in the basket, and I still have virtually no information about the empty basket. In that same way, I cannot communicate much, if any, useful information if all I say is what immaterial is not, for instance if I say, immaterial is not physical. On the other hand, it is certainly true and certainly important useful information (actually a defining identity condition) to say every immaterial object is distinct from every physical object.

1939. Furthermore, it would be extremely useful if I described the empty basket to mean there are no objects that are distinct from the basket, occupying the basket (this is not the place to discuss emptiness as an object; I do that in Section VI). The information that no objects occupy the basket is an identity condition description for empty basket. It is also a shared identity condition for any other empty container; empty vs occupied is important information about all baskets, and all containers. An identity condition of all baskets and all containers is that they are either empty or they are occupied, but not both, same place same time. Therefore, that information is necessary but not sufficient to fully describe an empty basket. For example, it is necessarily true for all empty baskets that they have no objects occupying the basket. However, it is certainly true and certainly important information that every empty basket is filled with emptiness, which is something, not nothing.

1940. There are situations in which it is coherent, correct and even necessary to describe something by saying what it is not, but it is also important to acknowledge that is never a complete description of something (= anything). For instance, that is true for all categories that are opposites, say immaterial and physical categories. If I know the identity conditions of physical, it could be very useful to know that some immaterial object I am considering does not have those properties, for instance I do not need to bother looking for them. For example, an identity condition of physical material (say baryonic matter mass) is that you can bump into it, and I know that I cannot bump into consciousness, therefore that is strong evidence that consciousness is not physical; that consciousness is category distinct from physical.

1941. Strawson’s description of physical having experiences means he is saying all physical objects share the identity condition “intrinsic experience” with immaterial consciousness. In principle, that is not necessarily incoherent, because it is, generically speaking, possible that there are some identity conditions that are shared between categories. However, it is literally impossible for physical objects to have experiences, say feel what it is like to be a chair, or feel what it is like to be a marble. Therefore, Strawson’s thesis is deep into fatal logical reification category errors.

1942. It is intuitively obvious = observable by every human being virtually every instant they are awake that consciousness has experiences, that consciousness permits human beings to have experiences, or that consciousness has the exclusive power of feeling experiences = sentience, for instance you could not know you had an experience if you had no awareness of it, and only consciousness has that awareness. It is certain that no physical object (including a physical brain) is sentient. Have you, or has anyone else, ever empirically observed that any, let’s say inanimate physical object, has experiences, say for example, can anyone observe that a stone has the experience of feeling its contact with another stone? Absolutely not. Does a stone have interactions or relations with other stones? Absolutely yes. Does that in any stretch of imagination mean a stone has experiences? Absolutely not. To suggest that a stone, or any other physical object, has sentient feeling experiences is incoherent and irrational; in fact, claiming that any physical object has sentient experiences is the fatal logical reification category error. In fact, having experiences is a unique = exclusive, and a necessary identity condition of consciousness and it is also certain that consciousness is in the immaterial category.

1943. I infer that it is coherent, useful and even necessary information to fully explain (consistent and complete) that the immaterial category is the opposite of the physical category, for example = non-physical. Saying what something is not, is quite necessary in the case (case is another term for category, for instance limit-case) of describing actual opposites. That is important information to communicate meaning about the objects being described, it is not empty information.

Category Identity Conditions (Additional Details)

1944. I present additional details about some identity conditions, comparing the immaterial and physical categories, for instance some of the is/is-not boundary distinctions between those categories.

1945. A-spatial (= independent of spatial location boundaries; spatial location has nothing to do with identity conditions of the immaterial category). There is no way to empirically observe or mathematically measure any location of any immaterial object, say for instance consciousness. A-spatial is something, not just the absence of spatial locations.

1946. A-spatial does not mean without any possible or actual location at all. On the other hand, all actual physical objects necessarily have exactly some specific empirically observable spatial location, or path of motion, and that information is mandatory to consistently and completely describe that physical object. If the object is a physical path there would also be empirically observable momentum, velocity and speed; none of those state conditions are relevant to describe any immaterial object, for instance consciousness does not have momentum, velocity or speed).

1947. A-spatial: I note that quantum elementary mass units are not actually physical before they interact with other objects. Such objects can only be described with probability mathematics. They take actual physical form only after they have interactions or relations with other objects; at which point they become actual physical objects. Furthermore, no immaterial object interacts with physical objects, which means no immaterial object is governed by the four natural forces (= interactions; gravity, electromagnetism, strong nuclear and weak nuclear). Quantum elementary mass units, even photons propagating in wave form interfere (= a kind of interaction and/or relation) with each other (for instance generating information interference patterns which can be physically recorded as clouds of dot point hits on the recording screen of an interferometer in a double-slit experiment).

1948. A-spatial: on the other hand, immaterial objects, say consciousness, and physical objects necessarily have relations. One kind of relations includes interact causally (= three kinds of immaterial causality; genesis-emanate, genesis-create and create-manifest); however immaterial causality relations is a distinct category of relations from the four natural forces.

1949. Invisible = no interaction with electromagnetism visible light radiation; electromagnetism is one of the four natural forces = interactions.

1950. A-temporal = independent of temporal location boundaries; temporal location has nothing to do with identity conditions of the immaterial category. A-temporal is something, not just the absence of time. A-temporal does not mean that an immaterial object does not exist at some possible or actual time. For instance, I can report that I am conscious and it happens to be 1:00 am on some exact day and year, etc., but that is not relevant or useful information that tells us anything about immaterial consciousness. On the other hand, all actual physical objects necessarily have exactly some specific temporal location (= some exact time or duration of time when they actually do exist), and that information is mandatory to consistently and completely describe that physical object. No specific time can be determined for the existence of quantum elementary mass units in near-existence domain; they are a-temporal because they are not actually physical, yet, rather they exist only as probabilities of possible or potential to become actually physical; they exist only as mathematical abstractions.

1951. Simultaneous is an identity condition of every instance of the immaterial category. No immaterial object interferes with the spatial or temporal locations, momentum, or path of propagation, of any physical object or any other immaterial object. Furthermore, no physical object can block any immaterial object from being in the same location at the same time as the location and time that can be empirically observed for any actual physical material object, for instance my consciousness is fully operational right here right now even as I sit in this physical chair inside my physical kitchen.

1952. Simultaneous means that spatial and temporal locations anywhere, or everywhere, all-at-once are possible, for instance the exact same immaterial abstract idea can exist anywhere or everywhere without limitation (but that certainly does not mean every idea has to exist anywhere or everywhere without limitation, just that it is possible). Not a single actual physical material object has that identity condition. Emptiness is ultimately simultaneous because it does occupy exactly the total set of Euclidean empty zero points, but emptiness is not a physical material object, rather emptiness is a physical non-material object, for instance emptiness is elementary, which means it does not have any elementary mass objects as constituents. Emptiness is literally not massive. Emptiness is a special bridge object between the immaterial category and the physical category.

1953. Simultaneous: I note it is a common fatal logical error to assume any elementary quantum mass unit, say an electron or a photon, actually physically exists as a superposition, simultaneously anywhere, therefore everywhere all-at-once. In fact, it is correct to say that before any elementary quantum mass unit interacts with or is observed by any other object, there is some mathematical probability it could possibly exist anywhere, or everywhere all-at-once, but that is certainly impossible for any actually physical material object. I also note that emptiness (not acknowledged to exist by physicists) is a bridge object that is simultaneously immaterial and physical, for instance if offers no friction resistance against any other object to pass through, but on the other hand it does host all physical objects everywhere (spatial), all-at-once (temporally) in our whole physical universe. Emptiness simultaneously occupies the whole of our physical universe, but that makes emptiness a physical-non-material object, not a physical material object. On the other hand, at minimum, immaterial objects, say thoughts and feelings, do exist somewhere, for instance inside an ego consciousness docked to a unique physical body/brain/central nervous system organism = a human being, and it is certain that human being is exactly some location at exactly some time, while having those consciousness thoughts and feelings.

1954. Zero resistance to pass-through by any other object. This identity condition is two-way, in the sense that immaterial objects do not resist objects passing through them, nor do any other objects resist immaterial objects passing through them.

1955. A-thermodynamic = independent of thermodynamics. Immaterial objects are not intrinsically involved in any exchange of heat; only physical objects exchange heat, which also necessarily means immaterial objects are not involved with any of the four natural forces. In fact, immaterial consciousness can have causal relations with physical objects (for instance superconsciousness genesis-create and ego consciousness create-manifest), as strictly limited by all laws of physics, however, no immaterial objects (say any form of consciousness) are in any way dependent upon any laws of physics such as the four natural forces, thermodynamics, entropy etc.

1956. A-entropic = independent of entropy. No immaterial object generates entropy because they are all a-thermodynamic, in the sense that changes in the object (say changes in conceptualization of ideas) do not cause disorder of information; in fact, many instances of immaterial objects, say all forms of consciousness, cause the ordering of information, which is a reduction of entropy, without violating laws of thermodynamics).

1957. A-priori-1 = independent of empirical observation = independent of physical. It is literally impossible to empirically observe any immaterial objects because they necessarily exist without any appearance, they are all invisible, because they do not interact with electromagnetic visible light radiation.

1958. Some but not all immaterial objects are a-priori-2 = exists before anything physical began to exist), for instance eternal and superconsciousness. Everything that does exist before anything physical began to exist is necessarily immaterial.

1959. Only immaterial is substance but not all immaterial is substance. An identity condition of substance is a-priori-3 = has immaterial original intentional power of causality, for instance only eternal and superconsciousness are a-priori-3-substantial. Nothing physical is substance because it does not have power of original intentional causality, rather everything physical, including all laws of physics are strictly ontologically limited to being automatic (for instance obeying the original programing by superconsciousness that created them). Everything that has original immaterial intentional power of causality is necessarily immaterial.

1960. Some but not all immaterial objects are holons, for instance eternal, superconsciousness, witness consciousness and ego consciousness. Literally everything that exists with a beginning (including physical material category, physical non-material category and immaterial category), necessarily exists inside eternal. Literally everything physical that exists necessarily exists inside superconsciousness because superconsciousness causes all of them to begin to exist and eternal causes superconsciousness to begin to exist. Some physical objects are complete holons, others are not, because they are physical but fragmentary, not complete.

1961. For instance, eternal exists without beginning, therefore eternal is omni-a-priori, which certainly exists before anything physical. That means eternal is also omni-substantial. Substance has power of immaterial original intentional causality. The one and only eternal has omni-power of original immaterial intentional power of causality = genesis-emanate. Eternal genesis-emanates the one and only hypostasis = superconsciousness. Superconsciousness has original immaterial intentional power of causality = genesis-create. Superconsciousness genesis-creates everything else that exists with beginning. Ego consciousness has original immaterial intentional power of causality = create-manifest physical. Substance and original immaterial intentional power of causality are identity conditions of immaterial eternal and immaterial consciousness (all forms).

1962. Holon unity of wholeness (= wholes inside wholes = dualism inside monism) is an identity condition of our whole physical universe; our universe is a single whole live organism. Holon unity of wholeness is also an identity condition of every complete complex object. Complex objects are made from elementary quantum mass units. Every quantum elementary mass unit is whole (= complete with no internal structure, no constituent parts, just itself).

1963. Strawson clearly makes a category distinction between experiential and non-experiential (1963i). He then extends that category distinction by claiming that some instances of the non-experiential category are “proto-experiential” (1963ii) by which he means capable of permitting experiential to emerge from them, under just the right circumstances (whatever that might be). In any case, making his thesis with reference to experience, rather than consciousness, permits him coherently (but falsely) to claim he has saved the doctrine of physicalism, and simultaneously to have solved the hard problem of consciousness. He certainly has not done either of those things. Quote 1963ii is in direct logical contradiction with quote 1963iii; however, quote 1963iv provides the unless caveat, which seems to save the rationality and coherence of it all, and presumably saves the doctrine of physicalism. In fact, statement 1963iv is a false metaphysical inference (in this case speculation = not a sound logical inference), but fails to be a defense of physicalism. It is false because it is, upon even casual inspection, an instance of the fatal logical reification category error. In fact, the physical category is logically irrevocably distinct from the immaterial category (as all categories are irrevocably distinct from each other).

i.      “The experiential/non-experiential divide [= distinct categories], assuming that it exists at all, is the most fundamental divide in nature (the only way it can fail to exist is for there to be nothing non-experiential in nature).” Galen Strawson² (brackets original) [brackets added]

ii.      “Experiential phenomena can indeed emerge from wholly and utterly non-experiential phenomena. This is possible because these non-experiential phenomena are intrinsically suited to constituting experiential phenomena in certain circumstances, and are ‘protoexperiential’ in that sense, although ultimately non-experiential in themselves.” Galen Strawson³

iii.      “…experiential phenomena cannot be emergent from wholly non-experiential phenomena…you can’t get experiential phenomena from P [physical] phenomena, that is, shape-size-mass-charge-etc. phenomena…” Galen Strawson⁴ [brackets added]

iv.      “So if experience like ours (or mouse experience, or sea snail experience) emerges from something that is not experience like ours (or mouse experience, or sea snail experience), then that something must already be experiential in some sense or other. It must already be somehow experiential in its essential and fundamental nature [intrinsic], however primitively or strangely or (to us) incomprehensibly; whether or not it is also non-experiential in its essential nature, as conventional physicalism supposes.” Galen Strawson⁵ (brackets original) [brackets added]

1964. It is correct that categories have relations with each other, but the identity conditions that are unique for one category do not exist in any other category. It is also correct that relations between categories include knowable paths between them, say from consciousness to physical and from physical to consciousness. Those interactions may even be causal, as is the case going from consciousness to physical, but not going from physical to consciousness. We can soundly infer that is a correct description, otherwise there is no answer to the fundamental ontological questions, what caused the first-first, and what caused the first physical thing in the first universe. Immaterial causality is the necessary path from eternal to superconsciousness to physical, but there is no possible path of causality from physical to superconsciousness to eternal. Strawson incorrectly reveres the direction that is active in the path between consciousness and physical.

1965. Eight: an eighth feature of Strawson’s “real physicalism” is causality. According to Strawson (and virtually all physicalists), all causality is physical causality. Strawson denies immaterial causality, for instance he denies that mental can cause physical to be what physical is (notwithstanding he is aware of double-slit experiments with quantum elementary mass units, which unequivocally reveal that immaterial consciousness looking (obviously immaterial mental) causes quantum elementary physical mass units to do something, say take the particle or wave form. On the other hand, Strawson acknowledges that it is equally impossible to go from physical to consciousness if 1) classical physicsalism is accepted, and 2) consciousness is actually immaterial. However, he also acknowledges that consciousness is undeniably real, therefore he correctly infers that the classical interpretation of physicsalism cannot be the correct interpretation, but his inference that real physicalism is the correct interpretation because of his metaphysical assumption that everything physical is intrinsically experiential, is necessarily false.

1966. Nine: a ninth feature of Strawson’s “real physicalism” is Strawson’s solution to the hard problem of no path between physical and consciousness (in either direction) is to assume everything physical is already conscious in the sense everything physical is intrinsically experiential = capable of having experiences, which according to Strawson is the essence of what consciousness is. I agree that having experiences is an intrinsic identity condition, for instance property and or function, of ego consciousness, but deny that physical objects have any such power (not intrinsic and not emergent either). I also agree with William James (1896i), that consciousness had to exist from the very beginning of the whole physical universe. In fact, I go further than James and infer that consciousness necessarily exists a-priori (a-priori-1,2 and 3), literally before the first physical thing in the first universe began to exist. I infer that in this quote James denies Strawson’s hypothesis that “protoexperiential” physical permits consciousness to emerge from intrinsically experiential physical, for instance “Merely to call the consciousness ‘nascent’ will not serve our turn,” notwithstanding that Strawson infers that James supports his thesis.

1967. Ten: a tenth feature of Strawson’s “real physicalism” is panpsychism. Strawson endorses one interpretation of panpsychism, but there are many competing interpretations. One common interpretation is that consciousness ontologically exists ultimately simultaneously = everywhere (all possible locations in time and space), and that consciousness is simultaneously in everything (that consciousness occupies every object that physically exists). That is the interpretation that I endorse. Some interpret panpsychism to mean that consciousness is a constituent of everything (one of the things everything is made from, in the same way quantum elementary mass units, say quarks are constituents of all complex physical baryonic matter mass objects). I reject that interpretation. Others interpret panpsychism to mean everything that exists is conscious (that consciousness is a property and/or function of every physical object). I deny that interpretation. Some interpret panpsychism to mean that consciousness is a knowing kind of stuff = knowledge (cognitive, mental, thought, etc.) kind of stuff, but that mental stuff is actually physical; in other words, physical is capable of knowing = having knowledge). I deny that interpretation. Some interpret panpsychism to mean that consciousness is an experiential kind of stuff (that physical objects are capable of having sentient experiences, presumably including feelings and emotions). That is Strawson’s version of panpsychism. Strawson’s interpretation is called panexperientialism rather than pancognitivism. I deny Strawson’s interpretation of panpsychism.

i.      “Panpsychism…is one of the oldest philosophical theories, and has been ascribed to philosophers including Thales, Plato, Spinoza, Leibniz, William James, Alfred North Whitehead, Bertrand Russell, and Galen Strawson.” Wikipedia⁶

ii.      Panpsychism: “Any ontology that takes mind or some quality of the mind as ubiquitous [= simultaneously everywhere] can be take[n] as panpsychist…In contemporary usage, panpsychism is synonymous with panexperientialism rather than pancognitivism. Panexperientialists take experience of some form as ubiquitous, while pancognitivists take cognition…as ubiquitous.” Wikipedia⁷ [brackets added]

iii.      “All physical stuff is energy, in one form or another, and all energy…is an experience-involving phenomenon. This sounded crazy to me for a long time, but I am quite used to it, now that I know that there is no alternative short of ‘substance dualism’, a view for which (as Arnauld saw) there has never been any good argument. Real physicalism…entails panpsychism, and whatever problems are raised by this fact are problems a real physicalist must face.” Galen Strawson⁸ (bracekts original)

iv.      “…something akin to panpsychism is not merely one possible form of…real physicalism, but the only possible form…” Galen Strawson⁹

1968. Strawson’s real physicalism version of the doctrine of physicalism cannot avoid two fatal logical contradiction errors, reification and infinite regress, therefore must be rejected as false. Strawson is aware of the fatal logical reification category error, and the fatal logical infinite regress error, nevertheless he succumbs to both.

1969. Strawson’s real physicalism is virally infected with the fatal logical reification category error when he assumes immaterial consciousness (unambiguously in the immaterial category) is a physical phenomenon. Fatal logical reification means attributing properties, functions and relations to a category that could not rationally be interpreted to have them. In fact, he denies the immaterial category even exists. He also assumes that everything physical is experiential, a term he uses to replace the term consciousness. In fact, sentient experience is an identity condition of consciousness, not a replacement for consciousness. He also replaces the immaterial category with the experiential category, which simply renames a category, but cannot be interpreted to mean that he correctly replaces the immaterial category. It is impossible to correct the fatal logical reification category error, unless Strawson’s entire thesis is rejected as false.

1970. Only immaterial ego consciousness feels (= sentience) what it is like to have any experience. Only immaterial ego consciousness has feeling knowledge certainty, for instance “I exist” (= self-awareness). It is only ego consciousness that has cognitive (= mental) meta-awareness = awareness of awareness = consciousness of consciousness = self-awareness (with certainty). Only ego consciousness can observe itself. Only ego consciousness can explain itself. No physical object can do any of those things.

1971. Strawson’s fatal logical reification is that consciousness (in the immaterial category) is physical (in the physical category) and that physical is conscious. I infer (it is also intuitively obvious) that while any physical object can have interactions = relations with other objects (either immaterial or physical), that certainly does not mean, let’s say stones collected at the waterline of a rocky beach, have experiences with each other. Stones at a beach waterline do not fall in love with each other, they do not have parties to celebrate a new year, they do not experience fear, happiness, joy, anger, or any other instance of feeling emotion. Nor do stones think (cognition), nor do stones have sensations (see, hear, taste smell or touch). Stones make no decisions, and take no intentional agent actions. No two stones are aware they are touching each other. Electromagnetic radiation does not have an experience of scattering when it collides with other physical objects, rather it has interactions = relations with other objects, which physicists can empirically observe and measure with mathematical precision.

1972. Strawson’s use of the word “experience,” including his phrase “intrinsic experience,” which he attaches literally to everything physical that actually exists in the whole physical universe (for instance stones, cars, planets, etc.), is just another word for Rovelli’s relations (RQM = relational interpretation of quantum mechanics), or another word for Whitehead’s process reality. However, that substitution of terms fails, because it is not rational philosophy, not rational science, not natural science, and not rational mathematics, rather it is straight up fatal logical reification. Interactions and relations are category-distinct from experiences. It is coherent to say all experiences are interactions and relations, but a false inference to assume all interactions and relations are experiences.

1973. Strawson firmly rejects dualism (literally = more than one thing; a multiplicity of objects), and he claims to have a coherent philosophy without dualism, however, that denial of dualism is a fatal logical reification error he cannot recover from.

1974. Note the clever distinction between “physicalism” (referring to the normal interpretation in physics science, which I deconstruct elsewhere in this manuscript Section V), and physicsalism (Strawson’s pejorative term for the traditional version), which he claims denies his concept of experience, and “real physicalism” which is apparently the good kind that is correct, coherent, rational; and only Strawson has figured this out (= original = invented by Strawson). He reduces the font size of “s” in physicsalism to make it visually apparent that it is a difference that makes a difference. Unfortunately, it does no such thing. I agree with Strawson that positivism in the traditional doctrine of physicalism denies the immaterial category, which necessarily includes denial of consciousness and denial of eternal, and according to Strawson necessarily includes denial of experience, and I agree that is indeed an egregious intellectual logical contradiction error, but it seems clear to me that Strawson falls into exactly the same trap, though he claims not to. Strawson’s denial of dualism lands him in the same logical contradiction that he accuses proponents of traditional physicsalism of.

i.      “They [= classical and quantum physicalists] are prepared to deny the existence of experience.” Galen Strawson¹⁰ [brackets added]

ii.      “…a large and fatal mistake. This is because we have no good reason to think that we know anything about the physical that gives us any reason to find any problem in the idea that experiential phenomena are physical phenomena.” Galen Strawson¹¹

iii.      “…this particular denial is the strangest thing that has ever happened in the whole history of human thought, not just the whole history of philosophy.” Galen Strawson¹²

1975. Strawson’s real physicalism is also virally infected with the fatal logical infinite regress error when he incorrectly assumes everything that exists is physical. That is a tautological argument in the form of chasing the answer to a question, but never coming to ground with any rational, coherent, correct, logically consistent and complete answer. For instance, the claim that everything is physical cannot be accepted as an a-priori axiom statement with intrinsic truth value. In fact, to convince any rational person of the truth-value of that statement requires a rational coherent answer to several questions. For instance: “What existed before the first physical thing?” “What caused the first physical thing to begin to exist?” “Is it coherent (= even remotely plausible) that the first physical thing created itself?” “Is it coherent (= even remotely plausible) that nothing could actually be something that has some kind of agent power of causality that could have created the first physical thing?” No, those assumptions are incoherent and irrational.

1976. There is nothing wrong with tautology (if it is not the infinite regress circular form, or chasing an answer to a necessary question, without bound). For instance, it is necessarily tautologically true that a thing is exactly, only and always itself. That statement has natural a-priori axiom truth value.

1977. According to Strawson, everything that exists is physical, therefore consciousness which does obviously exist, must also be physical. That is the fatal logical category reification error. It is also the fatal logical infinite regress error, because if you trace the logic back to the beginning, you never come to ground, you fail to explain what caused the first physical object in the first universe. Strawson cannot avoid that fatal logical infinite regress error, because of natural a-priori axiom truth. Axiom: nothing physical can create itself. Therefore, Strawson has no explanation of how physical began because physical is the only thing that exists according to his tautological argument. Axiom: everything physical exists with a beginning. The only possible source of the first physical thing must exist without beginning, and there is only one thing that exists without beginning (by common definition), eternal. Eternal is the only possible explanation for what caused the beginning of our whole physical universe.

1. Galen Strawson, “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism”, pdf excerpt from Real Materialism and Other Essays, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008, p. 61.

2. Strawson, p. 65.

3. Strawson, p. 68.

4. Strawson, p. 68.

5. Strawson, p. 68.

6. Wikipedia “Panpsychism”

7. Wikipedia “Panpsychism”

8. Strawson, p. 71.

9. Strawson, p. 58.

10. Strawson, p. 55.

11. Strawson, p. 55.

12. Strawson, p. 55.